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I. Introduction
A general stream adjudication is a comprehensive proceeding, usually
judicial, for determining the priorities, nature, and scope of all existing uses of
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water from a common source.1 The original need for such a proceeding emerged
in the nineteenth century because western states had not yet developed statesupervised procedures for establishing and recording water use rights, procedures
that ensured an accurate record of each use’s priority and extent.2 Initially,
states turned to courts as the mechanism for making these determinations by
establishing a judicial proceeding in which all claimants using water from the
same stream were to file declarations of their claim.3 On the basis of testimony
from the claimants, the court then decreed the priority date and extent of each
water right.4 The manifest limitations of the court process prompted most states to
put in place permitting requirements for all new claims.5 A few states, beginning
with Wyoming, also used administrative processes to review and finalize all claims
previously established.6
Remarkably, general adjudications, just like those employed back in the
nineteenth century, are still being used today in many western states.7 In part,
states are using adjudications to bring pre-permit uses into their administrative
water right systems.8 In a few cases, senior water users initiated the general
adjudication seeking a determination of priorities so junior uses could be
administered (curtailed) in times of shortage.9 Most commonly, states initiated

For a comprehensive discussion of western water law generally and general stream
adjudications specifically, see John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudi
cating Rivers and Streams, Part I, 8 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 355 (2005) [hereinafter Thorson
I]; Part II, 9 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 299 (2006) [hereinafter Thorson II]. A good summary of
adjudication law is provided in A. Dan Tarlock, Law of Water Rights and Resources, Chapter
7 (Updated July 2014) [hereinafter Law of Water Rights].
1

A. Dan Tarlock, The Illusion of Finality in General Water Rights Adjudications, 25 Idaho L.
Rev. 271, 281 (1988–89) (“adjudications developed to correct the deficiencies of a non-centralized
system of water rights acquisition and exercise”) [hereinafter Tarlock]. See also Lawrence J.
MacDonnell, Prior Appropriation: a Reassessment, * U. Den. Water L. Rev. *, * (2015) (forthcoming)
[hereinafter Prior Appropriation].
2

See infra note 18 and accompanying text (Colorado developed the first adjudication process.).
3

4

See infra notes 19–27 and accompanying text.

5

See infra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.

6

See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.

A good overview of ongoing general adjudications around the West as of 2006 is provided
in Thorson II, supra note 1, at 337–55.
7

Most commonly these are uses established under common law prior appropriation
principles before states initiated permitting systems and that have not previously been adjudicated.
8

The ongoing general adjudication in the Gila basin began in this manner. See Joseph M.
Feller, The Adjudication that Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 405 (2007) [hereinafter
Feller]. For a useful but now somewhat dated summary of state laws respecting when private suits
may be managed as a general adjudication, see Stuart T. Waldrip, Water Rights - Finality of General
Adjudication Proceedings in the Seventeen Western States, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 152, 153–57 (1966)
[hereinafter Waldrip].
9
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general stream adjudications in recent years to obtain a determination of federal
and Indian reserved water rights.10
Many commentators have noted the cumbersome nature of general stream
adjudications, their length, their expense, and the sometimes unsatisfactory
outcomes they produce.11 Nevertheless, we are told: “While adjudications are
inherently clumsy structures, westerners should probably get used to living
with them.”12
This article begins in Part II A. with a general discussion of general stream
adjudications, their origin in Colorado, their adoption and evolution in other
states and in Colorado, and the constitutional and legal issues these processes
have faced. Part II B. discusses use of general adjudications by individual water
users, including the United States. Part II C. discusses the importance of the 1952
McCarran Amendment in renewing interest in the use of general adjudications.
Part III explores the structure of general stream adjudications and considers
whether that structure is legally necessary for the purpose of determining previously
unadjudicated water rights. In particular, it examines the assumption that these
proceedings require the participation of all water users because the determination
of water rights is an adversarial process in which parties can only be bound if
they are parties. The article concludes in Part IV that general adjudications are an
anachronistic mechanism that are not legally necessary to determine previously
unadjudicated non-federal water uses and that they are an unnecessarily complex
and expensive process for this purpose. We begin with a discussion of general
stream adjudications.

II. General Stream Adjudications: An Overview
A. Origins and Development
In the world of western water, an adjudication is an official determination
(administrative or judicial) of the perfection of an individual water right—that
is, that an appropriator has placed water to beneficial use in accordance with
10
Thorson II, supra note 1, at 336 (“States commenced their water adjudications with the
grim conviction that federal reserved rights did in fact exist, a concern somewhat softened by the
fact that most of these rights would be determined in a forum perceived to be more favorable: state
court.”); see also Tarlock, supra note 2, at 280 (“The [McCarran] Act was passed in 1952, but it
did not begin to drive water rights adjudications until the Supreme Court interpreted it to apply to
Indian and non-Indian water rights.”).
11
See Tarlock, supra note 2, at 272 (“General adjudications are expensive and controver
sial.”); A. Lynne Krogh, Water Right Adjudications in the Western States: Procedures, Constitutionality,
Problems & Solutions, 30 Land & Water L. Rev. 9, 10 (1995) [hereinafter Krogh] (“Water rights
claimants, courts, legislatures, and agencies involved in water right adjudications are deeply
frustrated by the complexity and resultant length and cost of these adjudications.”).
12

Thorson II, supra note 1, at 464.
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law.13 A general adjudication refers to a single proceeding that simultaneously
determines the status of all claims to the use of water from the same source (such
as a particular stream).14 In addition to verifying that each claimant has placed
water to beneficial use in accordance with law, the adjudication determines or
verifies the parameters of each right: its priority date, its point of diversion, its
rate of diversion, its purpose of use, and its place of use. In this manner, an official
record of all perfected rights is established that serves both as legal title of the
rights and that can be used for administration of uses in times of water shortage.15
The need for some kind of process for establishing legal title and clarifying
priorities arose because, originally, users simply took the water they wanted
without any governmental supervision. As treatise writer Clesson Kinney noted
in 1912:
Although a person may make a valid prior appropriation of
the water of a natural stream or other source of natural water
supply, he may record his notice in accordance with the law,
he may apply the water to some beneficial use or purpose for
many years, he may lay claim to his rights adversely to all the
world, and yet this is not deemed a sufficient determination of
his rights, for the reason that there may be many others who
have made like appropriations from the same source of supply,
and whose claims are bound in time in some manner to conflict
with the claims of the prior appropriator.16
Courts were called upon to determine priorities of conflicting users in the context
of a specific dispute, but the view emerged that it would be better to join all
existing users in a single proceeding that resulted in a final determination (a
decree) of the diversion rights and priorities of all rights.17 In this way, it was
thought, each user would gain certainty and the state would obtain an official
record of all uses.

The common law requirements for establishing a prior appropriation water right included
intent to appropriate, notice to others of that intent, physical possession of some portion of water,
and its application to beneficial use with diligence. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 2.
13

Under administrative systems as in Wyoming, individual claims can be adjudicated upon
submission of proof of beneficial use. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
14

States use this information to develop a tabulation of all rights from the same source that
lists these rights in order of priority. This tabulation serves as the basis for regulating junior uses in
times of water shortage.
15

3 Clesson S. Kinney, A Treatise on the Law of Irrigation and Water Rights and the
Arid Region Doctrine of Appropriation of Waters § 1531, p.2754 (2d ed. 1912) [hereinafter
3 Kinney].
16

Id. (“[T]he title to a water right is not perfect in any claimant until there has been an
adjudication or legal determination of the same”).
17
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Colorado, in 1879, was the first state to create a formal process for adjudicating
water rights.18 As recounted by water historian Robert Dunbar, water users there
proposed an administrative process to clarify use rights.19 The Colorado General
Assembly, however, decided to place this responsibility with district court judges.20
At a time when the legal rules governing appropriation of water were still in flux,21
the statute charged the district court with “adjudicating and settling all questions
concerning the priority of appropriation of water between ditch companies and
other owners of ditches drawing water for irrigation purposes from the same
stream or its tributaries within the same water district, . . . .”22 All water users
were required to provide proof of the date they began constructing the facilities
necessary to use water (to serve as the priority date) and the size of the ditch (to
serve as the measure of the diversion right).23 Colorado made it clear that failure
to participate would preclude any future claim to a priority preceding any of
those included in the decree.24 Once a use was adjudicated, however, it was no
longer necessary to participate in future adjudication proceedings.25 The process
envisioned a single decree that would establish the order of priority for all uses
and the maximum rate of diversion for each.26 It authorized the issuance of a
certificate to each user that could be filed with the county clerk, thus serving as
title of the water right.27
18

1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 99–05. See also Thorson I, supra note 1, at 409–11.

19

Robert Dunbar, Forging New Rights in Western Waters 91 (1983) [hereinafter Dunbar].

1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 92. Dunbar, supra note 19, at 88. According to Thorson et al, “The
committee rewrote the bill, believing the determination of property rights, including water rights,
was the proper domain of the courts.” Thorson I, supra note 1, at 409.
20

21

See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).

22

1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 99. The first judge in Colorado asked to perform this function refused:
I cannot bring myself to depart from the English and American systems of
jurisprudence. In the administration of justice in an English court there are always
parties, and sometime four: the actor, the plaintiff; the reus, the thing; the judex, the
court; and the juratta, the jurors; and each have their separate and proper functions to
perform. I cannot consent . . . to bring myself to leave the judicial position in which
I have been placed by the Constitution . . . and take the position of any actor, to go
around to determine, without being solicited, what are the rights of the respective
owners of the ditches in these several water districts.

Dunbar, supra note 19, at 94. The General Assembly modified the law in 1881 to provide that water
users would petition the court to determine the various priorities. Id. at 96.
23

Id.

1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 103. This rule became known as the postponement doctrine and
continues in force today. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-306 (2015).
24

Since all subsequent priorities were junior to those previously adjudicated, there was
no need for joinder of already decreed users. James N. Corbridge & Teresa A. Rice, Vranesh’s
Colorado Water Law, Rev’d Ed. 140 (1999) [hereinafter Corbridge & Rice]. There took,
however, considerable amounts of litigation to reopen decrees for the purpose of inserting an earlier
priority that had not been included in the original adjudication. Id.
25

26

1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 102.

27

1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 104.
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Elwood Mead, a first-hand observer of this process in Colorado, saw a
fundamental problem: water right determinations are more factual and technical
in nature than legal.28 Especially at that time, judges were generally unfamiliar
with hydrology and the amount of water required to accomplish a particular
use. Without some independent, on-site inspection to verify the claimant’s
information, a judge could only decree what the claimant requested—sometimes
an amount greatly in excess of what was required for the use.29 Mead’s solution
was to place this responsibility with trained professional engineers.30
Under Mead’s influence, the new State of Wyoming established in its
constitution a “board of control,” an administrative body that included the
state engineer and four division superintendents, and gave it supervision of
As Wyoming’s Territorial Engineer, Mead attempted to create a record of water rights
using existing court decrees. He describes the overwhelming problems he faced in Second Annual
Report of the Territorial Engineer to the Governor of Wyoming for the Year 1889, at
70–91.
28

29

Thinking back in 1930 on his experience in Wyoming, Mead reported:
The first request received by the territorial engineer to exercise his authority
in dividing the waters of a stream, was made early in 1888 by the city of Cheyenne,
which under the McGinnis decree had the first right to the waters of Crow Creek.
This request asked that the 75 ditches above the city be so regulated as to allow water
so come to meet the needs of the city.
On consulting the decree it was found that not one of these seventy-five ditches
were named or located. Instead, the decree made grants of water to individuals who
might live in Cheyenne, on their farm, or in Hong Kong. I consulted the Judge and
asked him how I was to determine what headgates to close or partly close in order that
the city’s requirements might be met. He said I would have to look up the individuals
to whom the water had been granted and ascertain from them where they proposed to
use the water allocated in the decree.
I also pointed out that the decree showed no relation between the actual use of
water and the amount used. For example, Anon Simmons, with 28 acres of land, was
granted a right to over 11 cubic feet of water a second, while the next appropriation,
with 300 acres of land, was only given 5 acre feet of water a second. In other words,
the first appropriation was given twenty times as much water for an acre of land as
the second. I told the Judge I knew something about the opinions and prejudices of
irrigators and that if I attempted to give one irrigator twenty times as much water for
the same acres as I gave another, it was probable that I would be lynched, and his reply
was the if I did not carry out the decree he would see that I was jailed!

Elwood Mead, Recollections of Irrigation Legislation in Wyoming, reprinted in Selected
Writings of Elwood Mead on Water Administration in Wyoming and the West 8–9 (Anne
MacKinnon and John W. Shields eds., 2000).
30

As Kinney noted in 1912 in speaking about administrative determinations:
Under this system, at least, there is no longer the ludicrous spectacle of learned
judges solemnly decreeing the right to use from two to ten times the amount of water
flowing in the stream, or, in fact, amounts so great that the channel of the stream
could not possibly carry them, and thus practically leaving the question at stake as
unsettled as it was before the trial. . . .

3 Kinney, supra note 16, § 1531, p.2755.
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“appropriation, distribution and diversion” of State waters.31 The Wyoming
Legislature directed the new State Board of Control to examine all existing,
undecreed water uses on a source-by-source basis and determine their priority
date and the extent and nature of actual water use—essentially an administrative
version of Colorado’s judicial adjudication.32 Breaking more new ground, these
provisions further required that anyone now wanting to use water first obtain a
permit from the state engineer.33 Once water was applied to beneficial use, the
permittee was to file proof of appropriation with the State; following inspection
confirming the use in accordance with the terms of the permit, the Board of
Control was to issue a certificate of appropriation, effectively adjudicating the
right.34 Thus, Wyoming gave an administrative board responsibility and authority
to determine all water rights—both for pre-existing uses and for new uses.
In 1900, the Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether administrative
determination of water rights was an unconstitutional exercise of judicial authority
or otherwise impermissible.35 Noting the particular importance of water to the
State’s development and the constitutional assertion of State ownership of water
to ensure its careful use, the court concluded:
The determination required to be made by the board is, in
our opinion, primarily administrative rather than judicial in
character. The proceeding is one in which a claimant does not
obtain redress for an injury, but secures evidence of title to a
valuable right,—a right to use a peculiar public commodity.
That evidence of title comes properly from an administrative
board, which, for the state in its sovereign capacity, represents
the public, and is charged with the duty of conserving public as
well as private interests.36
31

Wyo. Const. art. 8, § 2.

Now codified at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-206 (2015). The procedures to be followed
are specified at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§41-4-301–317 (2015). See also Lawrence J. MacDonnell,
Treatise on Wyoming Water Law 12, 15–16, 200–02 (2014) [hereinafter Wyoming Water Law].
32

33

Now codified at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-501(a) (2015).

34

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-511 (2015).

35

Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258 (Wyo. 1900).

36
Id. at 267. It analogized the process to the actions of the Land Office in the Department of
Interior issuing patents to properly entered public lands. The court noted:

In the development of the irrigation problem under the rule of prior appropriation,
perplexing questions are continually arising, of a technical and practical character.
As between an investigation in the courts and by the board, it would seem that an
administrative board, with experience and peculiar knowledge along this particular
line, can, in the first instance, solve the questions involved, with due regard to private
and public interests, conduct the requisite investigation, and make the ascertainment
of individual rights, with greater facility, at less expense to interested parties, and with
a larger degree of satisfaction to all concerned.
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The Nebraska Legislature adopted a system closely modeled after that of
Wyoming.37 The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
State’s administrative process for determination of water rights in 1903.38
Other state courts, however, resisted use of administrative determination of
water rights, finding that administrative determination violated the separation of
powers organization established under the federal and state constitutions or other
perceived legal requirements.39 Thus, in 1921 the Texas Supreme Court decided
that provisions of a statute giving power to an administrative board to determine
water rights, unconstitutionally gave the legislative branch judicial power.40 The
court concluded that “no power is more properly or certainly attached to the
judicial department than that which determines controverted rights to property
by means of binding judgments.”41
In the meantime, the newly formed United States Reclamation Service
proposed that states adopt a process for clarifying the extent of existing rights
and, therefore, the remaining amount of unappropriated water available for
development. The process would employ state administrators to do hydrographic
surveys and clarify the extent of existing uses. Then it would provide that
information to the state attorney general, who would initiate a general court
adjudication to obtain legal determination of existing rights.42 In 1909, Oregon

Id. at 266–67. Waldrip, supra note 9, at 158 (footnotes omitted) distinguished the Wyoming
approach from the Colorado approach in this way:
The Wyoming court has held that determinations under this system are not
quiet title suits, but merely a necessary antecedent to proper distribution of the state’s
water by its administrative branch. Thus, they differ in basic theory from their judicial
cousins, whose basis lies in a judicial action to quiet title to the rights.
The quiet title analogy is critiqued in infra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
37

Dunbar, supra note 19, at 107.

Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 93 N.W. 781, 795 (Neb. 1903). See also Enter. Irr. Dist. v.
Tri-State Land Co., 138 N.W. 171 (Neb. 1912); Ormsby Cnty. v. Kearney, 142 P. 803 (Nev. 1914);
Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Fourth Judicial Dist. of Nevada in and for Elko Cnty.,
171 P. 166 (Nev. 1918).
38

39
A good summary of the checkered history of court review of state statutory provisions for
determination of water rights is provided in Krogh, supra note 11, at 41–52.
40

Bd. of Water Eng’rs v. McKnight, 229 S.W. 301 (Tex. 1921).

41

Id. at 304.

Often referred to as the Bien Code for its drafter, Reclamation employee Morris Bien, this
model influenced legislators in several states seeking new Reclamation projects, including Oregon
and Washington. See Thorson I, supra note 1, at 413–14. According to Thorson et al:
42

Upon completion of the survey, the agency delivered its information to the state
attorney general, often in the form of a proposed determination. The state attorney
general then brought suit within a specified period, usually sixty days, and made all
water users in the basin parties to the action. The Code also gave the attorney general
the authority to intervene in pending private water adjudications. After a mandatory
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adopted this approach.43 The Oregon Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court upheld these provisions against various constitutional challenges,
including alleged violation of separation of powers.44 Several other states adopted
some version of this so-called “hybrid” model.45

B. General Adjudications Initiated by Water Users
In the absence of some state-initiated determination process, courts decided
that individual water users could file an action for such determination.46 More
expansively, some courts decided that such actions could also be used to join all
other users of water from the same source.47 The rationale was to avoid multiple

period for objections had elapsed, and the court completed hearings on the objections,
the court issued a final decree. Throughout the proceedings, the court could call upon
the administrative agency to provide it with hydrological facts.
Thorson I, supra note 1, at 414 (footnotes omitted).
43
Codified today at Or. Rev. St. § 539.150 (2015). A useful summary of state approaches is
provided in Krogh, supra note 11 at 19–30.
44
In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505 (Ore. 1914); Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440
(1916). The Oregon Court stated:

The statute prescribing the duties to be performed by the water board and its
members in their respective official capacities in a determination of water rights does
not confer judicial powers or duties upon the board or such officers in any sense
as indicated by the Constitution. Their duties are executive or administrative in
their nature. In proceedings under the statute the board is not authorized to make
determinations which are final in character.
In re Willow Creek, 144 P. at 512.
45
See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-4-15 (2015); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.090 (2015); N.D.
Cent. Code § 61-03-16 (2015). See also Krogh, supra note 11, at 19–30.
46

3 Kinney, supra note 16, § 1532, p.2756.

3 Kinney, supra note 16, § 1532, p.2756 (“It is held that in order to avoid a multiplicity of
suits, where a large number of persons claim rights to use or divert the waters of a stream by virtue of
riparian rights, appropriations, prescription, or otherwise, a suit in equity is the proper proceeding
to determine such rights and to enjoin the infringement thereof.”). See also Frost v. Alturas Water
Co., 81 P. 996, 997 (Idaho 1905) (involving an action brought by 20 water users against about 700
other users from the same source):
47

An examination of the decisions of this court in irrigation cases for the last 25
years discloses the fact that the practice pursued by the plaintiffs in this case as to
joinder of parties plaintiff and defendant has been uniformly followed, and apparently
recognized by the court, as well as the members of the bar; and, while the question
here raised has never before been passed upon by this court, many cases, open to
the same objection as here urged, have been from time to time before the court.
This practice has become general and well recognized in this state in irrigation cases,
although never before mooted in this court. It is clear that all the appropriators and
users of water from a common source have in a manner a common interest in having
the rights of the respective appropriators determined and quieted by the courts, and
in a decree enjoining any and all appropriators who are inclined to interfere with or
obstruct the rights of others or divert water to which they are not entitled from so
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lawsuits seeking determination of water rights.48 A few states enacted statutes
specifically authorizing water users to initiate adjudications.49
The United States has filed actions in federal district courts seeking general
adjudication of all rights to use water from particular sources in order to clarify
rights it was seeking. Thus, to protect interests of irrigators in the Newlands
Reclamation Project in Nevada, the United States sought adjudication of all
upstream rights on the Truckee and Carson rivers.50 The litigation that helped
lead to enactment of the McCarran Amendment was a quiet title action brought
by the United States against 3,000 other parties to establish riparian rights in
lands acquired as a military base in California.51 While commonly presented as
a quiet title action, these cases assume that federal and Indian water rights must
be determined in an adversarial proceeding that includes all other users of water
from the same source.
Such litigation raised a number of issues. Courts are accustomed to resolving
legal disputes between specific parties, and in some instances these cases resulted
from specific disputes between parties.52 The disputes often emerged because
of the absence of defined priorities and the inability of senior appropriators to
limit uses of upstream junior appropriators.53 In some of these cases, however,

doing by the restraining and injunctive power of a court of equity. Such a joinder we
think authorized by sections 4101, 4102, Rev. St. 1887. The reason for such a practice
is peculiarly strong and urgent in irrigation cases under the law as it exists in this state.
48

3 Kinney, supra note 16, § 1532, p.2756.

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-1 (2015) (authorizing five or more water users from
the same source to petition the state engineer to initiate an investigation of all water rights. The
state engineer then can decide whether a general adjudication is warranted.). The Utah Code also
provides that when any person initiates an action involving the determination of the rights of a
“major part of the water of the source of supply or the rights of 10 or more of the claimants of the
source of supply,” the court clerk is to notify the state engineer. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-3 (2015).
49

This litigation produced what is known as the Orr Ditch decree, discussed in Nevada v.
United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983). See also United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 11 F.
Supp. 158 (D. Nev. 1935) (action against all users of water from the Walker River); United States v.
Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1981) (quiet title action initiated in 1925
to determine all rights to use Carson River).
50

51

California v. United States, 235 F.2d 647, 652 (9th Cir. 1956).

For an example of the kinds of complexities that can arise from specific disputes that are
involved in proceedings to determine priorities, see General Determination of the Rights to the
use of All the Water, Both Surface and Underground, Within the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and
Jordan River in Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit, Wasatch, Sanpete and Juab Counties in Utah, 982
P.2d 65 (Utah 1999); see also Feller, supra note 9 (discussing conflicts that ultimately got folded into
the Gila River adjudication in Arizon).
52

For a case involving the need to determine priorities of rights not determined in a previous
adjudication, see McKean v. Lassen, 298 P.2d 827 (Utah 1956).
53

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol15/iss2/4
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other non-disputing water users were joined under the theory that determination
of their priorities might avoid future controversy.54 Indeed, the original general
adjudication statute enacted in Colorado resulted from just such a situation.55
But an adjudication is, at base, a process for determining priorities, not resolving
specific disputes.56 Processes that enable the mixing of water right determinations
and resolution of specific disputes are bound to be contentious and complex, an
image that was evoked well in this early Utah Supreme Court decision:
The theory of a river system adjudication is to fix each
appropriator’s rights and priorities so it will be definitely
known whether he is or is not injuring another by taking his
water. While it partakes of the nature of a declaratory judgment
in many of its aspects, it also involves a number of local
controversies which, instead of being tried as individual suits,
are tried on objections to the findings of the State Engineer, all
in one overarching suit. For the reason that there are involved
numerous local controversies which are adjudicated by the
decree and a declaratory judgment in reference to uncontested
findings, thus combining not only many controversies in one
suit but controverted and uncontroverted adjudications in the
same suit, provision had to be made by statute.57
Other courts struggled with how to characterize the nature of the general
adjudication proceedings. In 1894, the Colorado Supreme Court declared: “The
statutory proceeding to adjudicate priorities of right to the use of water is not an
ordinary civil action or proceeding. It is a proceeding sui generis, to which the
rules governing ordinary civil actions are not always applicable.”58 In 1895, the
Colorado Supreme Court stated: “The present action is in the nature of a bill
of peace, or an action of quia timet, and is quite analogous to an action to quiet
title to real estate . . . .”59 The Montana Supreme Court called such litigation a
water right suit and declared: “A water right suit, such as this, where all parties are
seeking relief, is different from most, if not all, other kinds of action.”60

54

See, e.g., Sloan v. Byers, 97 P. 855 (Mont. 1908).

55

Dunbar, supra note 19, at 88– 89.

56

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.

Spanish Fork W. Field Irrigation Co. v. Dist. Crt., 104 P.2d 353, 364 (Utah 1940)
(Wolfe, concurring).
57

58

People ex rel. Sterling Irrigation Co. v. Downer, 36 P. 787 (Colo. 1894) (in syllabus).

59

Louden Irrigating Canal Co. v. Handy Ditch Co., 43 P. 535, 537 (Colo. 1895).

60

Osnes Livestock v. Warren, 62 P.2d 206, 215 (Mont. 1936).
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In an ordinary civil action, a court only has jurisdiction to decide matters when
the parties and the subject matter are within the scope of its authority.61 Streams
may well extend beyond the geographical jurisdiction of a district court, thus
potentially limiting that court’s ability to consider matters involving water users
from the same source but located in different jurisdictions.62 Moreover, issues have
arisen when users, not party to a previous adjudication action, seek recognition
of their priority.63 Problems also have arisen in determining whether an action
is simply an ordinary civil proceeding or is regarded as a general adjudication.64
Courts have differed in whether to characterize such litigation as in personam or
in rem—that is, whether the court’s decision binds only the parties to the case or
whether its decision determines the status of a thing (property) and thus, binds all
concerned with that thing.65 Quiet title suits, which involve competing claims to
ownership of a particular piece of property, are regarded as in personam—applying
only to the parties to the case. Some courts have applied this same rationale to
water right suits, limiting the force of the decision only to those actually party to
the proceeding. Others have characterized such suits as in rem and thus applying
to everyone with an interest in the use of the water source.66
Once states instituted permit systems with administrative processes for
determination of completed water rights, the need for general adjudication
proceedings applied only to those uses established prior to the permit system.67
Only a few states, however, proactively determined the status of such water
uses.68 Others simply relied on privately-initiated adjudications; in a few cases,
authorizing state agencies to enter the adjudication either as a party or to provide
technical assistance to the court.69 Colorado retained its court-based approach
under which those seeking to make an appropriation of water file a petition with

61

Am. Jur. Courts § 60.

62

See, e.g., Taylor v. Hulett, 97 P. 37, 38 (Idaho 1908).

63

See, e.g., Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 269 (Wyo. 1900).

64

See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 148 P.2d 346, 348–50 (Utah 1944).

3 Kinney, supra note 16, §1534, pp.2762–63. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110,
143–44 (1973) (“Thus, even though quiet title actions are in personam actions, water adjudications
are more in the nature of in rem proceedings.”).
65

66

3 Kinney, supra note 16, § 1534, p.2762.

Montana did not establish a comprehensive permit system until 1973. 1973 Mont. Laws,
ch. 452, codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-302. Consequently all uses established prior to that
date must now be reviewed and adjudicated.
67

68
Wyoming was the first state to direct its administrative agency to completely adjudicate all
water uses established prior to the institution of its permit system in 1891. Wyoming Water Law,
supra note 32, at 12.
69

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-1 (2015).
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the court to obtain a decree establishing the priority date and the extent of the
proposed water use.70

C. Modern Use under the McCarran Amendment
The resurrection of interest in judicial general stream adjudications primarily
resulted from passage of the McCarran Amendment in 1952,71 its requirement
that the proceeding involve a “suit” for adjudication of water rights,72 and
decisions of the United States Supreme Court deciding that state courts in such
general stream adjudications can determine federal and Indian reserved water
rights.73 The ability to force the United States to submit its reserved rights claims

70
Now codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-302(1)(a) (2015). In 1969 Colorado revised
its adjudication procedures to address a number of problems that had arisen over the years. See
Corbridge & Rice, supra note 25, at 139–43.
71
The amendment was enacted as section 208(a)-(c) of the Department of Justice
Appropriation Act. Act of July 10, 1952, Pub. L. No. 945, 66 Stat. 560 (current version at 43
U.S.C. § 666 (2014)). It reads as follows:

(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for
the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or
(2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is
the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under
State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary
party to such suit. The United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be
deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that
the United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall
be subject to the judgments, order, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and
may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be
entered against the United States in any such suit.
Id.
Thorson II, supra note 1, at 358 (“While the United States Supreme Court has not had
the opportunity to review a purely administrative adjudication, it is highly probable that such
a proceeding, even with the opportunity of an appeal to a court under the state administrative
procedures act, would not satisfy traditional notions of a judicial ‘suit.’”).
72

73
For an extended discussion of the McCarran Amendment, federal reserved rights, and the
use of general stream adjudications, see Lawrence J. MacDonnell, General Stream Adjudications,
the McCarran Amendment, and Federal Reserved Rights, 15 Wyo. L. Rev. 313 (2015) [hereinafter
GSAs]. The key U.S. Supreme Court decisions are: United States v. Dist. Crt. for Eagle Cnty.,
401 U.S. 520 (1971); Colo. River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); and
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983). The U.S. Supreme Court announced the
existence of implied reserved rights to water necessary to achieve the purposes of a reservation of
federal lands in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).

The shift back in the direction of judicial adjudications is contrary to the conclusion reached in
1966 in a comprehensive student note that examined adjudication laws in the western states at that
time. See Waldrip, supra note 9, at 151–52 (“The dwindling of ’ constitutional objection, together
with the growth of administrative law, has encouraged a trend toward administrative determination
of water rights.”).
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for determination in state court has provided a powerful incentive for states to
initiate general stream adjudications.74
The United States sought to resist being joined in state water right proceedings, arguing that they did not meet the requirements imposed under the McCarran
Amendment. The earliest such case involved an attempt by riparian land owners
in California to obtain an injunction in state court precluding the Bureau of
Reclamation from storing water in one of its storage facilities.75 Because the suit
did not include all water users from the source and did not seek adjudication of
priorities, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the United States could not be forced
to join.76
Efforts to resist joinder in a Colorado adjudication proceeding were
unsuccessful, however, even though a limited number of water users were party
to the action.77 The United States again sought to resist joinder in a general
adjudication proceeding by the State of Oregon for the Klamath Basin by arguing
that the Oregon process did not meet the comprehensiveness requirement in the
McCarran Amendment.78 In particular, the United States noted that much of
the proceeding would be managed administratively and that the proceeding only
applied to those with uses established prior to Oregon’s institution of a permitting
system in 1909.79 Observing, however, that water rights must finally be decreed by
a court under the Oregon system and that the U.S. Supreme Court had previously
upheld the adequacy of the Colorado process that did not directly include all
water users, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied relief
to the United States.80
The desire of western states to determine the existence of federal and tribal
claims to water and to quantify those claims in state court has prompted several
states to initiate general stream adjudications in recent years, sometimes based on
new legislation that attempts to provide for adjudications that meet the perceived
requirements of the McCarran Amendment.81 Typically, western states establish a
special court or designate an existing court and give it jurisdiction, comprehensive
enough to encompass all matters within a given river system.82 They direct the

74

See GSAs, supra note 73.

75

Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963).

76

Id. at 618.

United States v. Dist. Crt. in and for the Cnty. of Eagle, 458 P.2d 760, 761 (Colo. 1969);
see also Colo. River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
77

78

United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 765 (9th Cir. 1994).

79

Id. at 767.

80

Oregon, 44 F.3d at 770.

81

See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-212 et seq.; Law of Water Resources, supra note 1, § 7.1.

82

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-106(a) (2015).
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state itself to initiate the general adjudication.83 They identify the water uses that
are to be considered.84 And these states establish procedures for providing notice
and joining users in the process.85 They have incorporated some new features
intended to make the process function better.86

III. The Purposes for Using General Adjudications
Professor Tarlock provided this explanation for the contemporary use of
general stream adjudications:
There are three reasons for the current push to adjudicate water
rights on a grand scale other than to keep water lawyers employed:
(1) the adjudication of water rights increases the security of all
water rights because all use rights on a stream system are precisely
defined and all users can accurately predict the risks of curtailment
in times of shortage; (2) state water management will be enhanced
because water use data will be accurate and the state can therefore
make better choices in the allocation of unappropriated water,
especially for instream flow appropriations and reservations as
well as to better target water marketing opportunities for those
states interested in the concept; and (3) inchoate federal Indian
and non-Indian reserved rights claimed can be qualified, and thus
the great federal cloud on western water titles could be removed
or at least substantially limited.87
Thus, clarity of title to vested or perfected water rights and the extent of claims
to a water source is a primary objective.88 Such clarity of state records is thought
to facilitate better water management, presumably because priorities are clear and
merchantable title is established.89 Indeed, state records respecting ownership of

83

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-106(a)(iv) (2015).

84

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-106(a)(i)(A)(II–IV) (2015).

85

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-106(a)(ii) (2015).

See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 42-1401B(1) (2015) (“may use uniform parameters for
quantification of beneficial use recommended for rights within climatic regions of the state.”).
86

87

Tarlock, supra note 2, at 272.

See Krogh, supra note 11, at 12 (“The fundamental reason for water right adjudications in
the western states is the lack of an accurate record of water rights.”).
88

Tarlock, supra note 2, at 272 (“state water management will be enhanced because water use
data will be accurate and the state can therefore make better choices in the allocation of unappro
priated water, especially for instream flow appropriations and reservations as well as to better target
water marketing opportunities for those states interested in the concept. . . .”). But see Thorson
II, supra note 1, at 436 (“Even in areas where courts enter final decrees, there is little evidence to
indicate that adjudicated rights lead to better water management.”).
89
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water rights and use of water are woefully inadequate.90 In this age of increasing
needs for more effective management of water and for transfers of some existing
water uses to new uses, it is long past time for states to improve their records.91
One might ask, however, whether general stream adjudications are the best
mechanism for improving state water records.92
Thorson et al. state:
The fundamental public policy objective of comprehensive general
stream adjudications is to improve water management in the arid
west. Three related goals could satisfy this public policy if water
adjudications accomplished: (1) the confirmation of existing
water rights; (2) the quantification of federal reserved water rights;
and (3) the creation of a centralized listing of water rights.93
Near the conclusion of their two-part discussion, Thorson et al. conclude: “the
true value of a general stream adjudication is to create the impetus for water users
to reach settlement about allocation and administration, . . . .”94
These authors, despite their conclusion that general adjudications are here
to stay, offer little reason to be happy about that conclusion. Having stated

Indeed, an examination of water records in Wyoming in 1970 found considerable
disparities between existing records and actual, on-the-ground water practices. Michael V. McIntire,
The Disparity Between State Water Rights Records and Actual Water Use Patterns “I Wonder Where the
Water Went?”, 5 Land & Water L. Rev. 27 (1970). Considerable differences were found between
the total acreage authorized for irrigation and the amount of land actually irrigated. Id. at 27. The
study suggested the likelihood that some of the irrigated lands might not be those authorized in
state records. Id. at 28. In addition, the study reported differences between the total volume of
water authorized for diversion and actual diversions. Id. at 27–28. While total diversions fell below
total authorized amounts, several individual diversions substantially exceeded their authorizations.
Id. at 28. Another difference was the location of the point of diversion. Id. at 29. As the author
notes, Wyoming did not require state review of changes of point of diversion until 1965. Finally,
the report noted that there were a large number of permits outstanding for which no facilities had
yet been built. Id. at 29–30; see also Jackson B. Battle, Paper Clouds Over the Waters: Shelf Filings and
Hyperextended Permits in Wyoming, 22 Land & Water L. Rev. 673 (1987).
90

91
There is an inherent fluidity about water rights that frustrates any hope for absolute clarity.
See Tarlock, supra note 2, at 273.
92
Private services are now available that offer more accurate and comprehensive information
about state water rights than the records maintained by the states themselves. See, e.g., Ponderosa
Advisors LLC, Water Sage, http://ponderosa-advisors.com/OurServices.html (last visited June
29, 2015).
93
Thorson II, supra note 1, at 436. They conclude general stream adjudications “have fallen
short of the goals principally because they remain incomplete.” Id. at 463.
94
Thorson II, supra note 1, at 462. Feller, supra note 9, at 431 notes, however, that “convening
of a massive proceeding to determine all water rights on a stream creates another type of inefficiency,
namely, it forces the litigation of countless issues that, in the absence of such a proceeding, might
never have arisen in the course of actual disputes.” Id.
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that improved water management is the primary purpose of general stream
adjudications, they then say: “[f ]rom an effectiveness vantage point, it is difficult
to demonstrate that adjudications have significantly improved water management
in the region.”95 But they go on to state: “[e]ven in areas where courts enter final
decrees, there is little evidence to indicate that adjudicated rights lead to better
water management.”96 Next they state: “[f ]rom an efficiency perspective, stream
adjudications fare even worse. Governments and private parties have poured lavish
amounts of time and money into these cases to achieve only a small number of
finalized water rights. In most actually finalized, results [sic] in a gigantic per-right
cost of adjudication.”97 In particular, they point to the delays seemingly inherent
in the process.98
The solution, according to Thorson et al., seems to be to complete the
ongoing adjudications.99 Yet, as Professor Tarlock has noted, finality in the matter
of water rights may be an illusion: “the very nature of a water right combined with
the range of state and federal interests being asserted in water allocation preclude
the level of certainty and finality that states are seeking.”100
We turn next to an examination of two recently completed general
adjudications.

IV. Experience with Using General Adjudications:
The Big Horn and Snake River Examples
A. The Big Horn General Stream Adjudication
On January 22, 1977, the Wyoming Legislature enacted a new statute
authorizing the State Attorney General to initiate a general adjudication to
determine the “nature, extent, and relative priority of the water rights of all
persons in any river system . . . .”101 The purpose of the adjudication was to

95

Thorson II, supra note 1, at 436.

Id. They qualify that statement by saying that Colorado may be an exception because of its
continuous adjudication process.
96

97

Id.

Id. at 436 –37. The Gila River Adjudication in Arizona provides a good example of this
problem. See Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J. Davis, Revisiting Colorado River Water Conservation District
v. United States-There Must Be a Better Way, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 597, 612 (1995) [hereinafter McElroy
& Davis]; see also Feller, supra note 9.
98

99
They conclude that general stream adjudications “have fallen short of the goals principally
because they remain incomplete.” Thorson II, supra note 1 at 463.
100

Tarlock, supra note 2, at 273.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-106 (2015). Remember that Wyoming long ago had established
a process for general stream adjudications that were to be conducted by its Board of Control. Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 41-4-206 (2015). Wyoming Water Law, supra note 32, at 12, 200.
101
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(1) confirm existing decreed or adjudicated rights; (2) confirm the status
of uncancelled permits and adjudicate those that had been perfected; and
(3) determine the extent and priority date of any other right to use river system water
and adjudicate such rights.102 On January 24, 1977 the State filed its complaint in
the District Court for the Fifth Judicial District, seeking the general adjudication
of the “nature, extent, and relative priority of all the water rights of all persons in
the Big Horn River System . . . and all other sources in Water Division Number
Three . . . . .”103 The Complaint asked the court to initiate a general adjudication
action and to find that it had jurisdiction over the United States under the
McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666.
Finalized on September 5, 2014,104 the adjudication addressed questions
of Indian reserved rights associated with the Wind River Indian Reservation
(Phase I), federal reserved rights for national forests, Yellowstone National
Park, and Bureau of Land Management lands reserved for their springs and
waterholes (Phase II), and the status of all certificated and adjudicated water uses
and uncertificated permits for uses in the Big Horn basin (Phase III). Based on
detailed consideration of all practicably irrigable acreage within the reservation,
the courts found a total of 54,216 acres of what were termed historic lands, with
an allowable use of 290,490 acre-feet/year and 53,760 acres of what were termed
future lands with an allowable use of 209,372 acre-feet/year.105 The historic lands
involved more than 1,700 individual tracts.106 Many of these tracts (about 1,300)
held state permits that had to be removed; reserved rights were then attached to
about 28,000 acres with a total allowable use of about 158,000 acre-feet.107 The
process also confirmed the use of 685 wells, used mostly for domestic or stock
watering.108 In addition, the adjudication determined that so-called Walton rights
existed for 15,315.57 acres with an allowable use of about 90,000 acre-feet of
water per year.109
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-106 (a)(i)(A)(II-IV) (2015). A comprehensive discussion of this
adjudcation is provided in Jason A. Robison, Wyoming’s Big Horn General Stream Adjudication, 15
Wyo. L. Rev. 243 (2015) [hereinafter Robison].
102

In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, Complaint, January 24, 1977. The Complaint noted the
land area under consideration covered more than thirteen million acres, about twenty-one percent
of the State of Wyoming. Id. ¶ 12, p. 3.
103

104
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, State of Wyoming, Final Order (September 5, 2014), available at http://
bhrac.washakiecounty.net/DocumentCenter/BHCR/9-29-14a.PDF.
105
Interview with Nancy McCann, Big Horn Adjudication, Office of the Wyoming State
Engineer (August 26, 2014).
106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id.

Id. Walton rights hold a priority date of 1868, the date the reservation was established. See
Wyoming Water Law, supra note 32, at 220–21.
109
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Non-Indian federal reserved rights were resolved through negotiation and
entered into the adjudication through a stipulation and agreement submitted to
the court on November 20, 1982.110 Included in this settlement were Yellowstone
National Park, Big Horn Canyon National Recreation Area, Public Water
Reserves, Stock Driveways, Wood River Administrative Site, Big Horn National
Forest, and Shoshone National Forest.111
Phase III of the adjudication concerned all claims of right to use water within
the basin under state law. By agreement, all certificated/decreed rights determined
prior to January 1, 1975 were confirmed without review.112 Review concerned
permits that had not obtained a certificate of appropriation or had been only
partially adjudicated. This included 4,610 surface water permits (2,709 ditches,
931 enlargements, 660 reservoirs, and 310 stock reservoirs).113 Only about thirty
percent of these permits ended up getting adjudicated; the remaining permits
were cancelled.114 In addition, there were 10,600 unadjudicated groundwater
permits.115 Of these, about 7,730 were adjudicated without field inspection as de
minimis (less than twenty-five gallons per minute).116 Less than 500 well permits
received certification.117 The remaining permits were cancelled.118
Given that Wyoming decided not to examine already adjudicated rights
and that all pre-permit-system claims had long ago been incorporated into the
state system, the dominant issue in this phase of the adjudication concerned
outstanding permits that had not obtained a certificate of appropriation from the
Board of Control. Wyoming law since 1891 has required anyone wanting to use
waters of the State to first obtain a permit from the state engineer.119 Permittees to
use surface water are given a time period (no more than five years) within which

110
Stipulation and Agreement; Re: Partial Interlocutory Decree Covering United States’
Non-Indian Claims, November 20, 1982. This decree was finalized in 2005. Final Phase II Decree
Covering the United States’ Non-Indian Claims.
111
Interview with Nancy McCann, Big Horn Adjudication, Office of the Wyoming State
Engineer (September 9, 2014).
112
These rights were contained in the September 1978 Tabulation of Adjudicated Water
Rights, including over 200 pages of surface water rights and 78 groundwater rights. Interview with
Nancy McCann, Big Horn Adjudication, Office of the Wyoming State Engineer (August 28, 2014).
113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.

Id. The Legislature eliminated the map requirement for such wells. While adjudicated,
these wells do not receive certificates of appropriation.
116

117

Id.

118

Id.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-501(a). See also Wyoming Water Law, supra note 32, at 13,
100 (2015).
119
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facilities necessary to put water to beneficial use must be completed.120 Ditch
permittees are further given a specified time within which they must put water to
beneficial use; within five years from this date they are required to submit “proof
of appropriation.”121 A permit also is required prior to the construction of a well
for the use of groundwater.122 By statute, groundwater permittees are given no
more than three years from the date of permit approval to complete the well and
apply water to beneficial use.123 There are separate provisions for adjudication of
groundwater wells.124
The large number of permitted but unadjudicated claims is consistent with
earlier findings.125 Part of the problem is simply the staff time required to process
proofs of appropriation that are submitted.126 Another problem may be that
permittees do not understand they are required to notify the State Engineer when
they have completed construction of the necessary facilities.127 And, despite the
fact the Wyoming Supreme Court has made this clear, many permittees do not
understand their rights are not “perfected” until they have received a certificate

120
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-506 (2015). The State Engineer may extend this period. Permits
also are required prior to construction of storage facilities. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-301(a) (2015).
While the application is to specify the time that construction will begin and the time required for
its completion, there is no requirement that the permit include these as conditions. Nor is there
any requirement to put water to beneficial use by any date certain or to submit proofs to that effect.
Parties seeking a secondary permit to use water from a reservoir also must obtain a permit. Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 41-3-302 (2015). Here the statute provides: “When beneficial use has been completed
and perfected under the said secondary permit the division superintendent shall take the proof of
the water user under such permit and the final certificate of appropriations shall refer to both the
ditch described in the secondary permit and the reservoir described in the primary permit.” Id.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-302 (2015) (“final proof of appropriation must be submitted
within five (5) years after the date specified for the completion of the application of the water to
beneficial use.). But see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-511 (2015) (“Whenever an appropriation of water
has been perfected in accordance with any permit issued by the state engineer, the appropriator
may submit final proof of appropriation of water at any time within the time specified by W.S.
414506, . . . .”).
121

122

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-930(a) (2015).

123

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-934 (2015). The State Engineer may extend the period.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-935 (2015). The State Engineer may order an adjudication of
wells but, otherwise, it does not appear that adjudication is required. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3935(d) (2015). The adjudication of stock water or domestic wells authorized under 41-3-907 may
be initiated by the state engineer or by the well owner. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-935(b) (2015).
Wyoming Water Law, supra note 32 at 142–43.
124

Jackson B. Battle, Paper Clouds Over the Waters: Shelf Filings and Hyperextended Permits in
Wyoming, 22 Land & Water L. Rev. 673 (1987); see also McIntire, supra note 90.
125

126
Interview with Nancy McCann, Big Horn Adjudication, Office of the Wyoming State
Engineer (August 25, 2014).
127
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-506 (2015). This provision states: “Default by the holder of the
permit in any of the specified requirements shall work a forfeiture of the water right involved. The
state engineer may upon such default cancel the permit.” Id. The State Engineer must first notify
the permittee of the default.
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from the Board of Control.128 Still another issue may be statutory uncertainties.
The requirements appear to vary depending on whether the permit is for ditches,
for storage, or for groundwater wells. These issues suggest the need for clarification
of permittee responsibility and for clear direction to the state engineer to take the
steps necessary to cancel permits that are not in compliance with their terms.129
The adjudication process required thirty-seven years. The State had to provide
notice of the proceeding to every person with a claim of right to use either surface
water or groundwater of the Big Horn basin, an enormously complicated and
time-consuming task that ultimately identified more than 20,000 parties.130 It
required the services of six special masters, five district court judges, involved
six decisions by the Wyoming Supreme Court, and one decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court.131 It cost the State of Wyoming an estimated $20–25 million
dollars and uncounted millions expended by the United States, the tribes, and
the other parties.132 It quantified tribal reserved rights but left unresolved contentious issues respecting their use and administration.133 It cleaned up the status of
about 15,000 unadjudicated permits, mostly small groundwater wells.134 Views
differ whether the final results justify the process, but all seem to be happy that it
is over.135

128
The Wyoming Supreme Court has discussed at length the difference in the status of a
permit and an adjudicated right. Green River Dev. Corp. v. FMC Corp., 660 P.2d 339 (Wyo. 1983).
129
While Wyoming law places specific time limits on permittees, it also requires the State
Engineer to notify the permittees three months before the expiration of the time. Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 41-4-506 (2015). The statute states: “Default by the holder of the permit in any of the specified
requirements shall work a forfeiture of the water right involved.” Id. But then it adds: “The state
engineer may upon such default cancel the permit.” Id. The ambiguity in these two statements
appears to have allowed “forfeited” permits to remain in the state water rights system. In 1985
the State Engineer established an affidavit process enabling reinstitution of “expired’ surface water
permits. Memorandum from George F. Christopulos, State Engineer, Affidavit Procedure for Expired
Rights and Permits Where Beneficial Use Was Made More Than 20 Years Ago (January 3, 1985).
130
Interview with Nancy McCann, Big Horn Adjudication, Office of the Wyoming State
Engineer (August 27, 2014).

Judge Skar to Sign Historic Final Decree in the Big Horn River General Adjudication, Press
Release Big Horn River General Adjudication (copy on file with author).
131

Interview with Nancy McCann, Big Horn Adjudication, Office of the Wyoming State
Engineer (December 22, 2014).
132

The tribes sought to use their adjudicated future use rights to maintain a minimum flow
level in the Wind River. The Wyoming Supreme Court determined that these rights could only be
used for agricultural purposes on the reservation. In re The General Adjudication of All Rights to
Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992).
133

134
Interview with Nancy McCann, Big Horn Adjudication, Office of the Wyoming State
Engineer (August 28, 2014).

Interview with Nancy McCann, Big Horn Adjudication, Office of the Wyoming State
Engineer (August 25, 2014).
135
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B. The Snake River Basin Adjudication
The Idaho Supreme Court initiated the Snake River Basin Adjudication
(SRBA) on June 19, 1987.136 The process concluded on August 25, 2014.137 The
SRBA considered 151,604 claims to use water throughout the basin, an area
covering approximately three quarters of the State of Idaho.138 Idaho decided to
examine all claims to use water, including those previously licensed or decreed,
those established outside the State permitting system, and all federal and Indian
claims.139 All parties with a claim to use basin water were required to file a claim
with the SRBA court, including the roughly 60,000 with some state record of
their right.140 Of the approximately 151,000 claims filed in the adjudication,
about 138,000 claims were based on state law, and about 13,000 claims were
based on federal or Indian reserved water rights.141 Initially the State carried
out individual field inspections of all claims to verify the nature and extent of
their use.142 By the late 1990s the State shifted to the use of aerial photography

In the settlement of the so-called Swan Falls litigation, the State committed to pursuing
an adjudication of all water rights in the Snake Basin. See David B. Shaw, Idaho Dep’t of Water
Resources, Snake River Basin Adjudication (August 1988). The State of Idaho identified four
objectives for the Snake River Adjudication:
136

1. Identification and quantification of waters in the Snake River Basin will provide
the Department of Water Resources the information to manage the river and enforce
minimum flows.
2. Clear definitions of water rights will protect valid claims against future challenges
and facilitate transfers and trading of such rights.
3. A general adjudication will result in quantification of federal and Indian water
rights which until now have been unresolved.
4. The adjudication will define the amount of water available for development over
and above the proposed new minimum flows.
Cited in Clive J. Strong, The First Twenty Years of the Snake River Basin Adjudication: Is There an End
in Sight?, 50 Advocate (Idaho) 14, fn.24 (Jan. 2007) [hereinafter Strong I].
Clive J. Strong, SRBA Retrospective: A 27-Year Effort, 57 Advocate (Idaho) 28 (Dec. 2014)
[hereinafter Strong II].
137

Telephone interview with Clive Strong and Carter Fritschle, Idaho Dep’t of Water Resources
(August 28, 2014) [hereinafter Strong/Fritschle Interview].
138

139
Idaho established a permitting system for surface water rights in 1903, but the Idaho
Supreme Court decided that it was still permissible to establish rights through direct appropriation
and beneficial use of water. Sand Point Water & Light Co. v. Panhandle Dev. Co., 83 P. 347
(Idaho 1905). In 1963 the legislature expressly required all groundwater users to obtain a permit
and extended this requirement to surface water users in 1971. Strong/Fritschle Interview, supra
note 138.

Of these approximately 60,000 records, about 50,000 were based on licenses, decrees, or
permits. Strong/Fritschle Interview, supra note 138. The remaining 10,000 represented what are
called “statutory” claims—that is, claims based on beneficial use and recorded with the State.
140

141

Id.

142

Id.
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that it incorporated in a geographical information system.143 Of the state-law
claims based on decrees, licenses, permits, or statutory claims, about 3,000 were
disallowed.144 The claims based on beneficial use (statutory claims) were generally
disallowed because the claimants did not provide adequate evidence of actual
beneficial use.145 The disallowed claims based on prior decrees or licenses were in
the minority, and these claims were disallowed because the water use was found
to have been forfeited or abandoned.146 Another 7,000 (approximately) prior
decrees, licenses, permits, or statutory claims were never claimed in the SRBA,
and consequently decreed as “unclaimed disallowed” by the SRBA Court.147 It
is estimated that less than ten percent of the recommendations submitted by the
Idaho Department of Water Resources to the court were contested.148
The State successfully negotiated settlement of tribal reserved rights,
producing outcomes that are viewed as models of such agreements.149 The Idaho
Supreme Court generally took a very narrow view of reserved rights for federal
land reservations in the State, however.150 Consequently, “[t]he United States
filed more than 13,000 federal reserved water rights claims in the SRBA. Of
these claims, the United States was decreed 1,346 and disallowed slightly more
than 11,700.”151
Experience under the SRBA offers several potentially valuable lessons.
Despite the fact that this process examined all outstanding claims and included
thousands of federal and tribal claims, it was completed in a relatively short
twenty-seven years. One of the keys was the redefinition of the role of the Idaho
Department of Water Resources (IDWR) from party to the proceeding to
technical assistant to the process.152 Another was the use of aerial photography
and geographic information systems to verify locations and extent of water uses,
rather than time-intensive individual field investigations.153 A third was the use
of active dispute resolution processes to resolve differences between IDWR initial

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

Id.

146

Id.

147

Id. The State decided that domestic and stock water wells did not need to be licensed.

Id. The Department utilized an aggressive process of consultation and dispute resolution
with claimants that successfully resolved most of the disagreements.
148

149

See Strong II, supra note 137, at 28–29.

150

See the discussion in GSAs, supra note 73.

151

Strong II, supra note 137, at 28.

Strong/Fritschle Interview, supra note 138. Legislative changes in 1994 were necessary to
make this possible.
152

153

Id.
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recommendations and the claimants’ positions.154 A fourth was the successful use
of settlement processes to resolve Indian reserved water rights.155 A fifth was an
effective case management process that divided the task into more manageable
sub-basins, that dealt effectively with treatment of basin wide issues to resolve
questions that then could be applied to all claims, and that placed resolution
of state-law-based claims and federal/Indian claims on parallel tracks.156 A final
important factor was the strong commitment of the legislature to the process,
evidenced by its continued substantial financial support.157
The Snake River adjudication dealt with a much larger number of claims
than did the Big Horn and managed to reach resolution in fewer years. The State
expended about $93 million over the twenty-seven-year process.158 There are
no reported estimates for the costs incurred by other parties. Idaho law states
that failure to provide proof of beneficial use within the required time causes a
permit to “lapse,” apparently explaining why there were so few outstanding
undeveloped permits.159 While the process appears to have worked relatively
efficiently for state law-based uses, the outcomes for federal reserved right claims
were more problematic.160

V. Rethinking the Use of General Stream Adjudications
General stream adjudications are an artifact of a different era. They arose
because states had not established procedures for supervising the use of water, so
there were no reliable records establishing priority dates and other elements of
use. Courts struggled with this role, seeking to fit these proceedings into more
traditional forms of litigation while testing the flexibility of ordinary procedural
requirements to take account of the many obvious differences in determining
water rights. Who are plaintiffs and defendants in a general adjudication? Who
must be a party? What kind of notice is required? Who is responsible for serving
notice? What is the status of a water user who is not joined in the action? What
type of pleadings must be filed and what kinds of proof must be included? Should
parties be represented by counsel? What level of participation is required of the
parties? Should the state be a party or should it serve as a technical assistant to the
Id. The IDWA developed its preliminary findings and conclusions and submitted them to
the claimants. If claimants objected and the IDWA did not agree, the information was submitted to
a mandatory settlement process.
154

155

Id.

156

Id.

157

Id.

Brian Smith, As Water Rights Review Closes, Management Questions Loom, MagicValley.
(Aug. 26, 2014).
158

com

159
Idaho Code Ann. § 42-218(a) (2015). Interview with Carter Fritschle (September
3, 2014).
160

See GSAs, supra note 73.
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court? Must the court accept previous decrees determining priorities and diversion
rights? Should the court accept previous administrative determinations of
perfected rights? Should the court consider present and historic use in quantifying
the rights? How should the adjudication handle claims already initiated but under
which water has not been applied to beneficial use? On what basis may a court
eliminate claims on the basis of forfeiture or abandonment?161
This part examines three fundamental premises upon which general stream
adjudications appear to be based: (1) that determination of a vested water right
is an adversarial process, (2) that therefore all water users from the same source
need to be party to the process so they can protect their interests and so they will
be bound by the results, and (3) that courts must decree the existence of vested
water rights. We consider whether these premises require use of a general stream
adjudication to determine water rights.

A. Are General Stream Adjudications an Adversarial Process?
The basic premise of a general stream adjudication—that it is a dispute
among all water users from the same source of water that requires resolution—fits
into the judicial approach most often used, but is it an accurate representation of
the actual purpose of the process? There are, of course, disputes between users of
water from the same source that go to court for resolution.162 If the priorities of
the competing users have not previously been determined, the court will likely
have to make that determination to resolve the dispute. But resolution of disputes
about conflicting uses should be distinguished from processes intended simply to
verify and make official the priority and extent of a common law appropriation.
It appears that courts have mixed these two types of processes together when
discussing general stream adjudications, perhaps because of the initiation of
general stream adjudications in some cases by water users involved in some dispute
with other water users and perhaps because they are courts used to resolving
specific disputes.163
The judicial adjudication process took on the nature of an adversarial
proceeding, with a plaintiff water user petitioning the court to quiet his title
(meaning to establish his title) as against all other users of water from the same
source. Courts decided that they could entertain suits to determine the “relative”

See Thorson II, supra note 1, at 356– 432 (discussing how states and courts have attempted
to address these many issues).
161

162

See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.

See supra notes 46 –49 and accompanying text (respecting the ability of individual water
users to initiate general stream adjudications).
163
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priorities of users from the same source brought by one party “against” all other
users.164 Thus the Utah Supreme Court said:
The purposes of an action to determine rights to the use of
water, and the legal principles by which it is controlled, are
the same as in an action to determine title to real estate. The
difference in the nature of the subject-matter, and the fact that
two or more persons may have the legal right to use parts of the
same water source, or even the identical water, need not confuse
the legal aspect of the matter. The right to use a definite quantity
of water of a particular source is just as specific a thing, in legal
contemplation, as an estate in land, and the title to one is quieted
in precisely the same manner as the other.165
But, in fact, these proceedings are not the same as quiet title actions used to resolve
ownership disputes to the same property.166 Rather, they involve investigations
about whose rights to use water from the same source have vested earliest so
as to gain the protection of having a senior priority. The property at issue in a
general stream adjudication is not water itself, but individual rights to use water.
Adjudications involve determination of key aspects of the right of use, aspects that
are unique and particular to that use. Thus, unlike quiet title actions, adjudications
of water rights are not for the purpose of determining who has title to individual
water rights, but for the purpose of establishing title. These adjudications do
not remove a cloud on title to real property, but verify that all necessary legal
requirements to establish a water right have been met and document key elements
of the right—priority, use, and quantity. And, as the Wyoming Supreme Court
concluded in 1900, they involve the ratification of private rights to use a public
resource and enable administration of those rights in times of shortage.167
An adjudication is simply a determination of the priority and extent of a
water right.168 These are purely factual matters, based on law. A priority date
is determined, based on the actions of the individual appropriator as required
by law.169 The extent of the appropriation is measured by the amount of water

3 Kinney, supra note 16, § 1543, p.2775. Priorities are in fact not relative but absolute.
They do not depend on other priorities but are specific to the circumstances of each appropriation.
164

165

Logan, Hyde Park & Smithfield Canal Co. v. Logan City, 269 P. 776, 778 (Utah 1928).

166

For a statement of the purpose of quiet title actions, see 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quieting Title § 1.

167

Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 266– 67 (Wyo. 1900).

168

See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.

So, for example, under common law prior appropriation the priority dated from the
posting of notice of intent to appropriate, so long as actual beneficial use of water then occurred
in a timely manner. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 2. Colorado in 1879 decided to base the
169
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necessary to accomplish the intended use.170 Unlike under the riparian doctrine,
prior appropriation water rights are not correlative—that is, their use is not
dependent on the needs of other users from the same source of supply.171 While
the existence of a large senior use is potentially adverse to a downstream junior
water users, its existence and extent do not in any way depend on the downstream
user’s needs or interests. Other users may wish to participate in the determination
of water rights, but their involvement extends only to ensuring that the facts
upon which the determination is made are accurate and the law is being properly
applied.172 Legal use of water by a senior appropriator, by definition, cannot injure
a junior appropriator.173

B. Does a Determination of a Water Right Require a Proceeding Involving
All Users of Water from the Same Source?
Colorado’s original adjudication statute envisioned a single proceeding
simultaneously involving all water users from the same source of supply.174
Wyoming followed this approach to enable determination of all existing rights,
but provided for individual adjudications for all subsequent uses established under
its new permit system.175 Oregon followed this model but without directing a
state-supervised determination of all rights established prior to the institution
of its permit system.176 Even Colorado changed its approach so that those with
already adjudicated rights no longer had to be party to additional adjudications.177

priority date on the date construction of water diversion and delivery facilities began. See supra note
23 and accompanying text. Today, in permitting states the priority date is the date the application
to appropriate water is filed with the state. See, e.g., Wyoming Water Law, supra note 32, at 101.
170
Prior to the development of administrative procedures the amount of an appropriation was
measured by the size of the diversion facilities. See Prior Appropriation, supra note 2. The actual
needs for water to grow crops became better understood, the measure of an appropriation shifted to
the quantity of water necessary to achieve the intended use—known as the duty of water. See, e.g.,
Wyoming Water Law, supra note 32, at 111–12.

An explanation of the correlative nature of riparian water rights is provided in Law of Water
Rights, § 3:60, supra note 1. Riparian uses must be “reasonable.”
171

In Colorado, such participation by those filing statements of opposition to the determina
tion of a water right is said to be for the purpose of ensuring “strict proof.” See, e.g., Concerning
the Application for Water Rights of Turkey Canon Ranch LLC, 937 P.2d 739, 753 (Colo. 1997);
Buffalo Park Dev. Co. v. Mountain Mut. Reservoir Co., 195 P.3d 674, 686 (Colo. 2008) (“Any
person or organization may maintain a statement of opposition for the purpose of holding the
applicant for a conditional water right to a standard of strict proof.”).
172

Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32 Envtl. L .
37, 42– 43 (2002).
173

174

See supra note 26 and accompanying text.

175

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

176

Or. Rev. Stat. § 539.010 (2015).

177

See Corbridge & Rice, supra note 25, at 139–42.
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Despite the clear recognition that those with previously adjudicated rights do not
need to be party to subsequent adjudications, the matter remains unclear under
the laws of states whose statutes call for the inclusion of all parties and under the
McCarran Amendment’s requirements for a comprehensive adjudication.178
The view seems to be that because all water users from the same source are
potentially affected by the determination of other users’ priorities, they need to be
involved in such determinations. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court, when reviewing
the Oregon adjudication process, stated: “the rights of the several claimants are
so closely related that the presence of all is essential to the accomplishment of its
purposes, . . . .”179 The Nevada Supreme Court opined:
In a suit to quiet title to water rights, such as this, the main
purpose is to determine the respective rights of the parties to the
use of the water. A decree which leaves the controversy between
the parties unsettled, unadjudicated, undetermined, and subject
to future litigation, defeats the very purpose for which the action
is brought.180
Referring to what it called “water suits,” the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
In a water suit, an appropriator from a certain stream would
have to bring an action against each and every other appropriator
from the same stream before he could have his rights finally
adjudicated as to all of such appropriators. His bringing a suit
against one appropriator would not settle his rights. It would
leave him with other litigation to settle them, and for that reason
he is permitted to join as plaintiff or defendant every other
appropriator of water from the stream.181
The Senate Report accompanying the McCarran Amendment stated: “by reason
of the interlocking of adjudicated rights on any stream system, any order or
action affecting one right affects all such rights. Accordingly all water users on a

178
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 45-251(2) (2015) (““General adjudication” means an action for
the judicial determination or establishment of the extent and priority of the rights of all persons to
use water in any river system and source.”); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.095(2)(b) (2015); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 72-4-17 (2015); S.D. Codified Laws § 46-10-1 (2015). The U.S. Supreme Court held the
requirements of the McCarran Amendment met under Colorado’s unique ongoing adjudication
system. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.

Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Oregon Water Bd., 241 U.S. 440, 449 (1916). The Court seemed
to be basing this view on the need to gain a complete record of all claims so there could be effective
administration of uses. Id. at 447.
179

180

Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Ellison Ranching Co., 286 P. 120, 123 (Nev. 1930).

181

Creer v. Bancroft Land & Irrigation Co., 90 P. 228, 231 (Idaho 1907).
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stream, in practically every case, are interested and necessary parties to any court
proceeding.”182 In Nevada v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of finality in explaining the purpose of joining all parties in a
general adjudication.183 The Wyoming Supreme Court suggested that “[g]iven
the very nature of water rights (‘first in time is first in right’), the complexity
of a general stream adjudication such as this one, and the limited nature of the
resource itself, we can presume prejudice to others competing for water on this
river system.”184
Again, these statements all seem to reflect the view that water right
determinations are adversarial and that all users need to participate to protect
their interests. Yet, as discussed, virtually all states using a permitting system
provide for individual adjudication or determination that the permitted use has
matured into a vested right.185 Colorado determines new water rights individually,
addressing the potential problem of adversity by providing that newly adjudicated
rights cannot be senior to previously adjudicated rights.186 This requirement has
the salubrious effect of motivating appropriators to move quickly to get their
appropriations adjudicated. But other states regularly adjudicate individual rights
without postponing their actual priority date in this manner.187
We return again to the question: what is the purpose of a general adjudication?
Aside from the effect of the McCarran Amendment, is there any legal necessity for
using a general adjudication to determine water rights? More specifically, is there
anything about the determination of rights established prior to the institution
of a permitting system that might necessitate the use of a general adjudication?
Certainly there is the practical reality of the remoteness in time when these
uses were established and the absence of any public supervision. But the factual

182

Reproduced in In re Snake River Basin Water System, 764 P.2d 78, 84 (Idaho 1988).

A quiet title action for the adjudication of water rights, such as the Orr Ditch suit, is
distinctively equipped to serve these policies because
183

“it enables the court of equity to acquire juris-diction of all the rights involved and
also of all the owners of those rights, and thus settle and permanently adjudicate in
a single proceeding all the rights, or claims to rights, of all the claimants to the water
taken from a common source of supply.”
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129 n.10 (1983) (quoting 3 Clesson S. Kinney, A Treatise
on the Law of Irrigation and Water Rights and the Arid Region Doctrine of Appropriation
of Waters § 1535, at 2764 (2d ed. 1912)).
In re Big Horn River System, 85 P.3d 981, 996 (Wyo. 2004). In the Court’s view, one
party’s interest in gaining determination of a senior priority is adverse to the interest of other users
with junior priorities.
184

185

See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.

186

See supra note 177 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-4-511 (2015); see also Wyoming Water Law, supra note 32,
at 108–10.
187
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challenges are the same whether these rights are determined on a case-by-case
basis or in some kind of comprehensive proceeding that joins all cases together.
The arguments for a general adjudication focus on the need to avoid piecemeal
litigation and the supposed benefits of getting everyone’s priorities established in
a single proceeding.188 But these arguments fail to acknowledge the enormously
greater complexity of such proceedings and the degree to which numerous other
issues are likely to arise that can prolong and complicate the proceeding.189
The concept that all users should be joined in a single proceeding may also
reflect the circumstances in which the use of such proceedings arose.190 Under
common law prior appropriation, rights of use emerged out of the unregulated
actions of individual appropriators.191 There was no public supervision and only
the most primitive of records. The rules governing appropriation were still in
formation. Joining all users in a single proceeding not only had the appeal of
establishing a complete record of rights at that time and potentially avoiding
multiple law suits,192 it also ensured that whatever decision rules the court used
would be applied equally to all and that competing appropriators would help
ensure more accurate claims of use. As a legal proceeding, it was viewed as
necessary to have all users as parties so they would be bound by the decree.193
But the identification and inclusion of all claimants to the use of water from a
particular source presented significant challenges.194 Parties inadvertently omitted
from an adjudication might later argue they were not bound by it.195 Courts have

188

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.

189

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.

At a time in which there were no state administrative procedures for establishing and
determining new rights, there was the concern that a dispute between two parties would not
preclude the institution of a suit by other water users that prompted the use of multi-party judicial
adjudications. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
190

191

See Prior Appropriation, supra note 2.

192

3 Kinney, supra note 16, § 1543, p.2774.

Id. (“A decree attempting to adjudicate and settle the rights as between two appropriators or claimants in an action between themselves only as parties would not bind in any way the
other appropriators and users of the water from the same source, and not made parties to the
action.”). See also Waldrip, supra note 9, at 153, n.12 (“Since the alternative would be continual
lawsuits over any but the most meager of water sources, general determination for an entire stream
system or drainage basin, joining a large number of parties in one suit, represents the only rational
means of limiting litigation.”).
193

194
See, e.g., Thorson II, supra note 1, at 378– 81. See, e.g., General Determination of the
Rights to the use of All the Water, Both Surface and Underground, Within the Drainage Area
of Utah Lake and Jordan River in Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit, Wasatch, Sanpete and Juab
Counties in Utah, 982 P.2d 65 (Utah 1999)

See, e.g., State ex rel. Reeder v. Dist. Crt., 47 P.2d 653 (Mont. 1935); Albert W. Stone, Are
There Any Adjudicated Streams in Montana?, 19 Mont. L. Rev. 19 (1957–58).
195
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struggled with how to treat water uses that had not been included in previous
adjudications, and state law varies considerably.196 Issues have arisen about whether
it is necessary to join every type of user, no matter how small.197 And, as men
tioned, not all states require the joinder of all users in a general adjudication.198

C. Is a Judicial Decree Necessary to Determine Water Rights?
Another explanation for the use of judicial general adjudications was the view
that only courts can determine property rights.199 The fact that most states adopted
a requirement for final approval by courts suggests these legislators might have
believed this was true.200 A widely held view at that time was that the separation
of powers precluded administrative agencies from exercising what were viewed
as judicial duties.201 Alternatively, the use of courts might simply have reflected
the view by legislators, many of whom are lawyers, that courts are preferred to
administrative agencies.202 Still another possibility is that the use of a judicial

196
A good but dated discussion of this topic, including differences among the states, is
provided in Waldrip, supra note 9, at 164–77.
197
See Thorson II, supra note 1, at 367 (de minimis uses for stock watering and
domestic purposes).
198
Thomas H. Pacheco, How Big is Big? The Scope of Water Rights Suits Under the McCarran
Amendment, 15 Ecology L.Q. 627, 657– 68 (1988); Thorson II, supra note 1, at 367–68. See also
supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.
199
See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Use of the term “adjudication” inherently
suggests a judicial function, although today many administrative bodies are given adjudicative
authority. As discussed supra note 39, courts initially resisted the idea that an administrative body
could exercise anything resembling judicial authority. With the rise of administrative law in the
twentieth century the lines between judicial and administrative functions have blurred considerably.
See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 910 (1991) (Scalia, concurring) (‘Adjudication,’ in
other words, is no more an ‘inherently’ judicial function than the promulgation of rules governing
primary conduct is an ‘inherently’ legislative one.”).

This role for courts was included even in those states that otherwise put most of the
responsibility for making the determinations with administrative officers. See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 539.150 (2015).
200

201
See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The idea of separation of legislative, executive,
and judicial powers incorporated into the U.S. Constitution represented an attempt to limit power.
See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 575 (1984) (“These three powers of government are kept radically
separate, because if the same body exercised all three of them, or even two, it might no longer be
possible to keep it within the constraints of law.”).
202
Krogh, supra note 11, at 24 notes the preference among lawyers/legislators for judicial
proceedings. Dunbar, supra note 19, at 92 found this preference in Colorado back in the late
1870s and early 1880s. See also 3 Kinney, supra note 16, § 1595, p.2902 (The more we study
the workings of the laws of State control as to the determination by governing boards, in the first
instance, of existing rights to the use of water, the more firmly we are convinced that all judicial or
“quasi-judicial” powers should be taken from the State engineer and governing boards, and
vested in the courts, as is the case in Colorado, where, under our form of government, that power
properly belongs.).
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process reflected, in part, the absence of well-developed administrative processes
at the time.203 With robust development of administrative law and procedure
during the twentieth century, these concerns can no longer support the view that
only courts can determine water rights.204
The determination of the priority and extent of a water right is predominately
a factual matter, often involving technical questions outside the legal arena. As
stated by the Nevada Supreme Court:
Now the preliminary proceedings before the state board of control,
in taking testimony and making findings of fact concerning the
rights of the various claimants to the waters of a given stream,
are, in my judgment, not judicial, but rather administrative. The
powers of the board are not brought into action by the filing of
a paper in the nature of a complaint setting up asserted rights,
but by the mere presentation to it of a petition or request by
one or more users of water, without any allegations of issuable
facts, other than that the petitioner is a water user on the stream,
and a request for the determination of the relative rights of the
various claimants to such waters. No affirmative relief is asked,
and no adverse pleadings are required or permitted, or issues
joined, until after the evidence taken by the board is open to the
inspection of the various claimants and owners.205
While many western states have chosen to give courts a role in the final
determination of water rights, there does not appear to be any legal requirement
to do so.

VI. Possible Next Steps
This article argues that general stream adjudications have little if any utility
at this stage of water decision-making in the West. It is widely agreed that general
adjudications are complex, burdensome, and expensive.206 They originated
in an era in which there was no alternative mechanism for determining rights
established under common law prior appropriation principles. First utilized in
courts, they took on the trappings of traditional litigation, with plaintiffs and
defendants positioned as adverse parties, with actions characterized as quiet title
actions rather than adjudications, with traditional notions of litigation such as

203

See supra note 183 and accompanying text.

See generally Moses Lasky, From Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water by
the State—Via Irrigation Administration, 3 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 161 (1928–29) [hereinafter Lasky].
204

205

Ormsby County v. Kearney, 142 P. 803, 808 (Nev. 1914).

206

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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requiring joinder of parties so that the outcome—a decree—would be binding on
all users of water, with the concomitant problems of notice, and with many courts
acting to resolve other controversies that existed between users as part of the same
process. These processes took on a life of their own that extended far beyond their
original purpose—the determination of the priority and extent of water uses.
All the western states now have some kind of statutorily-established process
for determining water rights.207 In all states except Colorado, these processes
begin with the issuance of a permit and end with the issuance of a certificate
or license verifying that the authorized use has been perfected—that is, water
has been applied to beneficial use in accordance with the terms of the permit.208
Why not use the established verification processes to determine the status of any
outstanding pre-state-process water uses? Under this approach, the state legislatures
would need to enact a statute requiring all parties with established water uses
that have not been processed under the statutory water right laws or previously
decreed to provide proof of appropriation or the equivalent with the appropriate
state entity.209 The state entity would review these proofs in the same manner as
for those submitted as part of the permitting process.210 The major issue is likely
to be the priority date. Thus the new law or implementing regulations should
make explicit the nature of the proof that will be required to establish the priority
date. While there should, of course, be reasonable notice of each proceeding, with
opportunity for participation by other interested parties, the state entity would be
charged with making the determination based on the information presented, as
supplemented by its own investigations. Reliance would be placed on the state to
protect all interests, including those of users whose priorities turn out to be junior.
As demonstrated in Big Horn, adjudications can be useful to update the
status of permitted but undetermined (unadjudicated) claims.211 Perhaps a better
way to manage this problem is with clear rules, actively implemented, that ensure
permittees build the necessary facilities and place water to beneficial use within
the prescribed time(s) or are cancelled. Idaho’s laws and procedures appear to
promote this outcome.212
207

Thorson II, supra note 1, at 337–55.

208

Law of Water Resources, supra note 1, § 5:44.

It appears that, in some states, the state water agency takes on the responsibility of searching
out water uses to establish their continuing viability as water rights. See, e.g., Amy Joi O’Donoghue,
The water question: The staggering problem of determining water rights, Deseret News (May 16,
2014), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865617715/The-water-question-The-staggeringproblem-of-determining-water-rights.html?pg=all#h5rLLZy4wMkkHeC8.03 (describing the
efforts of the Utah Division of Water Rights to adjudicate water rights).
209

Presumably the state would rely on photographic and infrared imagery to verify uses and
would develop up-to-date GIS maps and databases for future water management purposes. See supra
note 153 and accompanying text.
210

211

See supra notes 112–18 and accompanying text.

212

See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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Adjudications also can remove unused claims from the record. Far more
efficient, however, would be active use of already existing state procedures for
determining abandonment and forfeiture.213 The problem here appears to be
reluctance to use these procedures, not their limitations.
To the degree that state general adjudications are motivated by the desire
to determine federal and Indian reserved rights in state court, removing this
authority would remove this motivation. One means by which this authority
could be removed would be if the U.S. Supreme Court reversed itself and
decided that reserved rights should in fact be determined in federal, rather than
state, court.214 Alternatively, Congress could pass legislation establishing special
procedures for determining reserved rights,215 directing that reserved rights be
determined in federal courts, or otherwise clarifying its intention with respect
to implied reserved rights. It is widely agreed that settlements are the preferred
strategy for determining reserved water rights so Congress could direct the use
of such settlements whenever possible.216 An important model is provided by
Montana’s Reserved Rights Compact Commission that is being used to reach
agreement on federal and Indian reserved rights in that State.217
There is something audacious and, at same time, almost foolhardy about
undertaking a general stream adjudication at this stage of water development in
the West. The sheer number of outstanding claims and rights is daunting.218 The
problems of notice are manifold.219 Case management presents major challenges.220
The potential burden on each claimant/water right holder can be significant.
213
For example, Wyoming authorizes the state engineer to initiate forfeiture actions to cancel
rights not used for five or more years. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-402 (2015).
214

For a more complete discussion, see GSAs, supra note 73.

An example of one legislative attempt is provided in Thorson I, supra note 1, at 467
(discussing a 1975 proposal during the Ford Administration).
215

216
See, e.g., David H. Getches, Foreword, in Bonnie Colby, et al., Negotiating Tribal
Water Rights: Fulfilling Promises in the Arid West, xvi (2005). But see Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal
Sovereignty and Intergovernmental Cooperation, in Tribal Water Rights: Essays in Contemporary
Law, Policy, and Economics 33 (Thorson, Britton, & Colby eds., 2006) (“many tribal leaders
feel they should litigate first and have a court affirm their rights, thus vesting in themselves greater
political power at the head of a negotiating table”). See also Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights,
Practical Reasoning, and Negotiated Settlements, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 1133 (2010).

For a good overview, see Merianne A. Standsbury, Negotiationg Winters: A Comparative
Case Study of the Montana Reserved Waterrights Compact Commission, 27 Pub. Land & Resources L.
Rev. 131 (2006). The Montana Statewide General Adjudication has been placed on hold, pending
settlement of outstanding reserved water rights. See also Strong II, supra note 137 (discussing
settlements in Idaho’s Snake River Basin Adjudication).
217

Strong states that the Montana statewide adjudication has 219,000 claims, that there are
82,000 claims in the Gila adjudication, and that there were 158,591 claims in the Snake River
adjudication. Strong II, supra note 137, at 28–29.
218

219

See, e.g., Thorson I, supra note 1, at 378.

220

Id. at 398.
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Costs to all participants, including the general tax-paying public, are surprisingly
high.221 While previously unadjudicated uses can be given a better title 222 and
can be integrated into the state water rights records, there are only modest
improvements in the existing state records—improvements that potentially could
have been achieved through other, simpler means.223 Adjudications can sometimes
help clarify unresolved matters of state law,224 but they can also raise unresolved
issues of state law that might better have been addressed in a specific dispute
between two parties.225
This article calls into question our use of general stream adjudications. These
are processes that arose in a different era, one heavily steeped in use of courts
and judicial processes to manage disputes and protect rights. While progressive
thinkers like Elwood Mead introduced an administrative alternative as early
as 1890, most western states were not willing to empower administrators to
be the ultimate arbiters of the existence of vested water rights. Yet experience
has highlighted the extraordinary complexity associated with the use of general
adjudications, their enormous costs to the state and the participants, the decades
of time they require to complete, and the modest benefits they produce. More
troubling, in some respects, is their use for determination of federal and Indian
reserved water rights, the inevitable difficulties of asking state courts to determine
rights based on interests often perceived to be adverse to the state, and the maze
of outcomes emanating from various state courts.226
States that were slow in instituting public supervision of water uses now
face the challenge of integrating uses into their administrative systems. General
adjudications are not an effective mechanism to accomplish this purpose.
Unfortunately the McCarran Amendment and the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decisions to allow federal and Indian reserved rights to be determined in general
adjudication have reinvigorated their use. It is time to reverse course, to use
existing state laws and review processes to clean up pre-permit rights and other
problems, and to determine federal and Indian reserved rights in federal courts or
through settlement processes.
221
The recently completed Snake River Adjudication cost the State of Idaho an estimated $93
million. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. There is no estimate of the costs incurred by the
United States, the tribes, or other parties.

Thorson et al. suggest that, in an age of water marketing, clarifying titles is one of the
important benefits of general adjudications. Thorson I, supra note 1, at 457–58. It is unclear
whether the public should bear this cost or whether title clarification should be the responsibility of
the parties to the water transfer transaction.
222

223

See supra notes 207– 09 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Strong I, supra note 136, at 15, noting that the adjudication resulted in several
Idaho Supreme Court decisions helping to clarify matters of Idaho water law.
224

225
See, e.g., Feller, supra note 9, at 419–20, noting the substantial delays caused by interlocutory
appeals to the Arizona Supreme Court as part of the Gila Adjudication.
226

This concern is more fully explored in GSAs, supra note 73.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2015

35

